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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to provide a better understanding of why some countries experience mass atrocities dur-
ing periods of democratic transition, while others do not. Scholars have long regarded democracy as an important 
source of stability and protection from mass atrocities such as genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. 
But democratic transition itself is fraught with the heightened risk of violent conflict and even mass atrocities. Indeed, a 
number of studies have identified regimes in transition as containing the highest risk of political instability and mass 
atrocities. What is overlooked is the question of how and why some regimes undergo such transitions without experi-
encing mass atrocities, despite the presence of a number of salient risk factors, including state-based discrimination, in-
ter-group tension and horizontal inequality. Utilizing a new analytical framework, this article investigates this lacuna by 
conducting a comparative analysis of two countries—one that experienced atrocities (Burundi) during transition, and 
one that did not (Guyana). How countries avoid such violence during transition has the potential to yield insights for the 
mitigation of risk associated with mass atrocity crimes. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1993, Burundi conducted free and fair elections after 
nearly thirty years under one party Tutsi-led authoritar-
ian rule. The results heralded a new government under 
a diverse yet ostensibly Hutu-led party, Front pour la 
Démocratie au Burundi (Frodebu). Six months later, in 
an attempted military coup, soldiers abducted and as-
sassinated its president, Melechior Ndadaye, along 
with Pontien Karibamwi and Gilles Bimazubute, the 
president and vice president of the National Assembly. 
This triggered a new wave of violence against both Hu-
tus and Tutsis, and became the precursor to a drawn-
out civil war, resulting in further atrocities that resulted 
in the killing of up to 400,000 civilians. A year earlier in 
Guyana, the country also conducted free and fair elec-
tions for the first time in nearly thirty years. There, the 
minority African Guyanese government lost power to 
the larger Indian Guyanese-dominated party. While the 
tensions between the two groups remained high, and 
some post-election violence occurred, regime change 
took place in a climate of relative calm. Why did Bu-
rundi’s transition herald mass killing and civil war? And 
how did Guyana, a country with similar risk factors,1 
manage to avoid such violence? 
The purpose of this article is to outline an agenda 
for studying the relationship between democratic tran-
                                                          
1 By “risk factors” I refer to factors that are commonly under-
stood to be long-term antecedents to mass atrocities. 
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sition and mass atrocities.2 Scholars have long regarded 
democracy as an important source of stability and pro-
tection from mass atrocities (Harff, 1998, 2003; Krain, 
2000, pp. 45-46). But democratic transition itself is of-
ten fraught with heightened risk of violent conflict and 
even mass atrocities (Collier, 2009; Goldstone & Ul-
felder, 2004; Mann, 2005; Snyder, 2000).3 Both Snyder 
(2000, p. 88) and Mann (2005, p. 4) point out that nas-
cent democracies, or countries in the early stages of 
transition from authoritarian rule are particularly at 
risk of identity-based divisions become the main fault 
line of electoral competition.  
To date, there is limited knowledge on why some 
democratic transitions give rise to mass atrocities and 
others do not. Indeed, research into the causes of mass 
atrocities have overwhelmingly focussed on cases 
where such violence has occurred, and very limited 
understanding and emphasis is placed on the condi-
tions that inhibit the perpetration of mass atrocities, 
despite high-risk conditions (Human Security Report, 
2011; McLoughlin & Mayersen, 2013; Straus, 2012). 
Scholarship in the field of comparative genocide stud-
ies has generally overlooked the question of why geno-
cide and other mass atrocities do not occur, despite the 
fact that the preconditions—or risk factors—commonly 
associated with such violence manifest far more fre-
quently than such violent outcomes themselves 
(Straus, 2012, p. 343). Incorporating a better under-
standing of negative cases has the potential to yield 
fresh insights into prevention. In particular, it considers 
the question of what local and national actors are do-
ing to mitigate the risk associated with mass atrocities, 
providing a counterbalance to much of the literature 
on conflict and mass atrocity prevention, which typical-
ly prioritizes external actors (McLoughlin, 2014a, pp. 
418-419).  
One approach to better understanding the nature 
of mass atrocity risk during periods of democratic tran-
                                                          
2 I define mass atrocities as widespread and systematic vio-
lence targeted against unarmed civilians, such as genocide, 
crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. 
3 For the purposes of this analysis, I use the terms “democratic 
transition” and “democratization” to refer specifically to the in-
itial process of moving away from authoritarian forms of rule 
to a process whereby, to use Linz and Stepan’s words, “suffi-
cient agreement has been reached about political procedures 
to produce an elected government, when a government comes 
to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote…” 
(1996, p. 3). While Linz and Stepan also stipulate that such a 
transition is complete when the ability to generate new poli-
cies is apparent, and the separation of power between execu-
tive, legislative and judicial power is apparent, I am particularly 
interested in the early stages of transition, when such process-
es are under construction. The reason for this is that scholars 
have identified the early stages of transition as being time 
when violence is most likely under certain circumstances. How 
and why some countries manage to navigate this phase while 
others do not is the question under investigation here. 
sition is to conduct in-depth analyses of both positive 
and negative cases—countries that have embarked on 
a period of transition, distinguished by the perpetra-
tion or avoidance of mass atrocities (see, for example, 
Mayersen & McLoughlin, 2011; Straus, 2012).4 My aim 
in this paper is threefold: to investigate the impact that 
long-term risk factors associated with mass atrocities 
have on countries undergoing democratic transition; to 
better understand how and why such risk becomes 
more acute during such periods; and finally, to identify 
and trace the political, economic and social processes 
that are instrumental in the avoidance of atrocities on 
the one hand, and in their perpetration on the other. In 
this article I present an analytical framework which 
forms the basis of such an investigation. Following this, 
I use the framework to conduct a brief analysis of one 
positive case (Burundi) and one negative case (Guy-
ana). The purpose of the comparative analysis is to il-
lustrate, in broad terms, how and why mass atrocity 
risk escalates and de-escalates during periods of demo-
cratic transition. 
By conducting such an analysis I do not intend to 
argue that were it not for certain factors, outcomes in 
each country would have been dramatically different. 
Rather, the purpose here is to contribute to the grow-
ing body of research within comparative genocide 
studies, which seeks to redress the over-emphasis on 
“what goes wrong”, by incorporating cases where simi-
lar patterns of risk have been effectively mitigated over 
time (see for example, Mayersen & McLoughlin 2011, 
p. 248). By doing so, this analysis seeks to provide a 
more nuanced understanding of the causes of mass 
atrocities during periods of democratic transition, and 
to gain insights useful for prevention. 
2. Background and Analytical Framework  
Since the end of the Cold War, many states have 
sought to transition from authoritarian to democratic 
forms of governance. Many western states view this as 
a favourable development, and have invested consid-
erable resources in support of democratization (DFAT, 
2013; DFID, 2013; USAID, 2013). However, there has 
been a more mixed assessment to democratic transi-
tion within the literature on civil wars, genocide and 
other mass atrocities, due to evidence that transitions 
can increase the risk of mass atrocities (Collier, 2009; 
Collier & Rohner, 2008; Mann, 2005; Snyder, 2000). 
There is no question that democratic regimes are far 
less likely to commit mass atrocities than autocracies, 
(see, for example, Harff, 2003, p. 66, and Rummel, 
                                                          
4 The most common approach to understanding the causes of 
mass atrocities is to compare past cases where such violence 
has occurred. This is the dominant methodological approach in 
the field of comparative genocide studies, as Straus (2012, p. 
343). 
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1994, pp. 23-24; 1997, p. 405). However, the process of 
transitioning authoritarian rule can be perilous. In suc-
cessive large-N studies conducted by the Political In-
stability Task Force (PITF), countries undergoing transi-
tion were found to be at greatest risk of political 
instability—genocide, rebellion, revolution or violent 
regime change—often characterized by mass atrocities. 
Another large-N study found that when poor countries 
(a per-capita GDP of less than US$2,750) undergo 
democratic transition, the risk of rebellion increases 
considerably (Collier & Rohner, 2008, p. 534), and with 
it the chances of mass atrocities. In addition, two 
strong claims emerged from two small-N studies: that 
“murderous ethnic cleansing” is “a hazard in the age of 
democracy”, especially in new democracies (Mann, 
2005, pp. 1-2); and that the international push for rapid 
democratization can lead to “nationalist conflict” if the 
process is commenced while national institutions are 
still weak, as it did in Rwanda and Burundi (Snyder, 
2000, p. 16). 
While this research clearly demonstrates the 
heightened risks associated with democratic transi-
tions, there are a number of significant oversights. 
First, very little has been written about how regimes 
undergoing democratic transition avoid mass atroci-
ties. Countries such as Ghana, Malawi, Zambia and 
Guyana all underwent democratic transitions without 
experiencing atrocities, despite the presence of risk. 
Second, although large-N studies identified heightened 
risk, we still do not fully understand what factors re-
duce risk during transitions.  
To better understand why these different outcomes 
unfolded during democratic transition in these two 
cases, I use a three-tiered analytical framework. The 
first tier identifies key structural risk factors associated 
with mass atrocities: politicized social division, state-
led discrimination (including the political and social ex-
clusion of people, on the basis of identity), low eco-
nomic inter-dependency, horizontal inequalities and 
prior atrocities (Goldstone & Ulfelder, 2004; Harff, 
2003; McLoughlin, 2014).  
Building on this, the second and third tiers are tai-
lored specifically for periods of democratic transition. 
The second tier consists of key claims about the nature 
of risk during democratic transition, such as a domi-
nant chief executive, factional division (political divi-
sion on the basis of ethnic, racial or religious identity), 
and low GDP (Collier, 2009; Goldstone & Ulfelder, 
2004; Mann, 2005; Snyder, 2000).  
The third tier identifies local and national sources of 
resilience, which have the capacity to mitigate risk. 
These include policies that promote social cohesion, in-
clusive leadership prior to transition, strong rule of law, 
diffusion of power, and policies promoting horizontal 
equality (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly 
Conflict, 1997; Human Security Report, 2011; McLough-
lin, 2014). The purpose of this part of the analytical 
framework is to identify and analyse processes of risk 
mitigation, or the breakdown of risk mitigation, during 
democratic transition.  
3. Case Study Selection and Analysis 
The choice of Burundi and Guyana rests on three prem-
ises. First, prior to transitions, each country contained 
structural risk factors associated with mass atrocities. 
The second is evidence of heightened risk during the 
transition away from authoritarian rule. For example, 
in both countries, electoral competition was fought 
along entrenched identity-based differences that had 
been a major source of tension (and indeed violence) 
in the past. The third premise is the point of difference 
between the two countries—that is, the occurrence (or 
not) of mass atrocities.  
Both countries were subject to authoritarian rule by 
minority-led parties, whose authority was supported 
by minority-led militaries. Politicized identity-based 
tensions in both countries were characterized by two 
dominant identity groups—minority Tutsis and majori-
ty Hutus in Burundi; and in Guyana, between the mi-
nority African Guyanese, and the more numerically 
dominant Indian Guyanese. Minority-led rule fuelled 
these tensions through state-led discrimination in both 
countries.  
There are also points of difference. While both 
countries experienced inter-ethnic conflict either in the 
early stages of independence, or in the final years of 
decolonization, the atrocities committed in Burundi, 
mostly against Hutus, far eclipsed the violence in Guy-
ana. Moreover, the tensions in Burundi were further 
complicated by the violent dynamics unfolding in 
Rwanda, which had a strong impact on the country’s 
political stability and inter-ethnic relations. Yet despite 
these differences, the comparative value of these two 
cases rests in the bipolar nature of identity-based ten-
sions, and the fact that both countries endured almost 
three decades of authoritarian rule and entrenched 
discrimination, with minority-led regimes in control. 
While other countries going through transition at simi-
lar times—such as Zambia and Ghana—and indeed 
would certainly add value to a larger study, the particu-
lar configuration of risk in Burundi and Guyana, along 
with their broad commonalities, contribute to their 
comparative value.  
There are two other benefits of this comparative 
analysis. First, it provides a platform for exploring why 
it is that on the one hand the prior atrocities in Burundi 
were surpassed by the length and severity of violence 
that ensued in 1993 and beyond; while on the other, it 
seeks to provide reasons as to why it was Guyana’s 
democratic transition managed to navigate challenges 
in a way that resulted in the isolated cases of post-
election violence falling far short of the limited atroci-
ties committed in the lead-up to independence. Sec-
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ond, it provides a lens over the contrasting ways that 
each country managed a hostile security sector during 
the early stages of transition; as I explore further be-
low, the behaviour of the armed forces and the police 
during transition was a crucial dimension to the escala-
tion or de-escalation of risk in both countries. While 
the circumstances that unfolded in both countries 
were contextually specific, there are broad lessons for 
prevention that can be gained, which could provide in-
sights for other countries facing similar risk factors. 
3.1. Burundi 
From the advent of independence in 1962 to the re-
sumption of free and fair elections in 1993, Burundi 
contained three long-term risk factors associated with 
mass atrocities: politicized social division, state-led dis-
crimination, and prior atrocities. 
Politicized tensions between Tutsis and Hutus were 
already acute by the time the territory embarked on 
independence. While society in pre-colonial Burundi 
had been unequal, within a royal hierarchy that at-
tributed more power overall to Tutsis (approximately 
14 per cent of the population) over the majority Hutus 
(85 per cent of the population), the Kingdom’s princely 
class, the Ganwa were neither Hutu nor Tutsi, and 
many Hutus exercised positions of power. Belgian co-
lonial influence made the relations more rigid—while 
ruling indirectly, they placed all political and economic 
power in the hands of the Ganwa and Tutsi, further 
depriving the majority Hutu (Lemarchand, 1996, pp. 
41-57). 
This strict division of power underscored tensions in 
the initial phase of independence, when Burundi’s con-
stitutional monarchy presided over a parliament with 
both Hutu and Tutsi representatives, in the ruling par-
ty, Union pour le Progrès National (Uprona). Despite 
the initial promise of an ethnically diverse political 
landscape, the competition for power over key posi-
tions spilled into violence. Burundi’s first prime minis-
ter, Pierre Ngendandumwe (a Hutu), was assassinated 
by a Rwandan Tutsi refugee in 1965. The king appoint-
ed a Ganwa as a successor, a move that angered the 
majority Hutu parliament. An attempted coup by the 
Hutu army officers in year was crushed by the Tutsi-
dominated army. Soon, however, competition for con-
trol of the state was played out between Hutu and Tut-
si elements within the government. A Tutsi-led military 
coup consolidated this power in the hands of Tutsi 
elites, while at the same time eliminating all Hutu lead-
ers from key positions within the bureaucracy and mili-
tary (Wolpe, 2011, p. 8). Firmly in control of the securi-
ty forces, the army launched a coup in 1966, declaring 
the advent of the First Republic.5 In the wake of the 
                                                          
5 The Second (1976–1987, under Lt. Col. Jean-Baptiste Bagaza) 
and Third (1987–1993, under Maj. Pierre Buyoya) Republics 
coup, the army installed a predominantly Tutsi gov-
ernment, turning Uprona into an instrument for Tutsi 
control (Lemarchand, 1996, p. 74). While in neighbour-
ing Rwanda Hutus overthrew the monarchy and re-
moved Tutsis from power, in Burundi Tutsi elites main-
tained their hold on power through repressive military 
rule that lasted for three decades. This hold on power 
compounded the grievances felt by Hutus.  
From the beginning of the First Republic, state-led 
discrimination against Hutus escalated and became in-
creasingly entrenched. With the Tutsi elites’ gaining 
control of the mechanisms of state, a range of repres-
sive measures were enacted. Hutus were deprived of 
parliamentary representation. By the 1980s, seventeen 
Hutu MPs made up the sixty-five-seat parliament. The 
exclusion became even more acute in the cabinet, 
where only four of the twenty ministries were given to 
Hutus. In Uprona’s fifty-two-member Central Commit-
tee, only two Hutus were present. There was one Hutu 
ambassador of the twenty-two posts available; and on-
ly two out of fifteen governors were Hutu (Uvin, 2009, 
p. 10). Yet even among Tutsis, representation was dis-
proportionate. Most of the upper echelons of the mili-
tary, as well as Burundi’s three presidents between 
1965 and 1993 were Tutsi-Hima6 from Bururi province 
in the southwest of the country (Uvin, 2009, p. 9). This 
added greater complexity to the discrimination in the 
country—not only were ethnic Hutus profoundly un-
der-represented in government, but control was firmly 
the hands of Tutsi elites from one province.  
Exclusion was evident in educational opportunities, 
although both Hutus and Tutsis suffered. Hutus were 
under-represented at tertiary level, while amongst Tut-
sis, Bururi province was again disproportionately fa-
voured. Indeed, 60 per cent of international aid for ed-
ucation was reserved for Bururi—Bururi students 
comprised 15 per cent of the total enrolments at the 
University of Burundi (Uvin, 2000, p. 10). The most de-
prived were Hutus. Of the small pool of students who 
went onto secondary school following primary educa-
tion, considerably less than half were Hutus. At univer-
sity level, only a third of enrolments were Hutu (Le-
marchand, 1996, pp. 108-109). Indeed, allocation of 
teachers and resources for education at all level varied 
greatly throughout the country. Bururi received the 
greatest resources. Other provinces, including Bujum-
bura City, Makamba, Gitega, Muramvya and Mwaro al-
so received a generous share of resources. Other prov-
inces in the north and the east of the country, received 
less than half of all teachers and resources, despite 
comprising more than two thirds of the population 
(Jackson, 2000, p. 25). Most Hutus were deprived of 
                                                                                           
were also the result of coups. 
6 Tutsi-Hima are Tutsis who are largely (but not entirely) from 
Bururi province, known for their anti-monarchical stance (Le-
marchand, 1994, pp. 11, 81). 
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 3, Pages 27-41 31 
education and opportunities for employment within 
the state sector (including the army and the police); 
and these limitations resulted in an inequality of eco-
nomic opportunity. This uneven distribution of re-
sources had two effects. First, it favoured Tutsis in 
some provinces, and second, it heightened ethnic rival-
ry in the north and the east (Lemarchand, 1996, pp. 
122-123).  
The over-representation of Tutsis at tertiary level 
had a flow-on effect with public sector recruitment, 
with most bureaucratic positions going to Tutsi gradu-
ates (Lemarchand, 1996, p. 65). The public sector was 
the primary source of wealth and opportunity in Bu-
rundi, so the inequality of opportunity that existed at 
all levels of the education system. This further com-
pounded the exclusion of Hutus, while at the same 
time fostering a Tutsi elite who had control of import 
licences and other profit-making opportunities. This 
discrimination in the education and the public sector 
had a profound impact on inter-ethnic tensions, in the 
early 1970s, when it became increasingly clear that 
many Hutus had no purchase in Burundi’s First Repub-
lic. As Lemarchand notes, “state-society interactions 
took the predictable form of increasingly brutal en-
counters between a Tutsi-dominated army and the Hu-
tu opposition” (1996, p. 80). 
Indeed, previous responses by the Uprona regime 
to Hutu opposition dramatically compounded the risk 
of atrocities during the transition in 1993. As Harff 
points out, one of the most the significant impacts on 
the risk of future atrocities, is prior atrocities (2003, p. 
66). There were two instances in Burundi’s recent his-
tory where atrocities were perpetrated against Hutus. 
The first was the military regime’s resorting to the 
most brutal tactics to crush dissent in 1972. In April of 
that year, a loose coalition of Hutus—students, school-
teachers, petty traders, some refuges from Zaire and 
some elites in Bujumbura—carried out a massacre of 
Tutsis, numbering in the thousands (Lemarchand, 
1996, pp. 93-96; Mthembu-Salter, Berger, & Kikoler, 
2011, p. 3). The response from Burundi’s army was 
brutal and swift. First, they engaged in counter-
insurgency strategies against the rebellion. Then they 
targeted all Hutus they suspected as having been part 
of the rebellion. In the process they conducted a pog-
rom that killed up to 250,000 Hutus, and displaced 
many more (Abrams, 1995, pp. 147-148; Bowen, Free-
man, & Miller, 1973, p. 1; Chrétien, 2003, p. 316; Uvin, 
2009, p. 10; Weinstein, 1972, p. 17).7 Almost all edu-
cated Hutus were killed, further depriving them of ac-
cess to the mechanisms of power.  
                                                          
7 The precise numbers killed vary according to different 
sources. Uvin, for example, estimates over 80,000 were killed, 
while Chrétien claims that at least 150,000 were killed. Both 
Weistein and Bowen et al. estimate the deaths to be up to 
250,000.  
Tensions peaked again in 1988 under new president 
Pierre Buyoya. Buyoya promised to bring about a rap-
prochement between Hutus and Tutsis by lifting re-
strictions on freedom of expression and releasing Hutu 
political prisoners (Lemarchand, 1996, p. 119). This lift-
ed hopes, but also triggered student strikes, mainly in 
secondary schools. This led to another increase in ten-
sions, particularly in the western provinces of Ngozi 
and Ntega, which shared borders with Rwanda, and 
housed large numbers of Rwandan Tutsi refugees. In 
Ngozi province in particular, the Tutsi administrator of 
the Marangara commune invoked violent rhetoric in 
his efforts to quash what he perceived as “illegal and 
nocturnal tribalist reunions” among the Hutu commu-
nity. This rhetoric brought back memories of 1972, fur-
ther compounding tensions. Violence broke out in 
neighbouring Ntega, provoking inter-ethnic attacks on 
both sides. The army intervened, crushing the violence 
while specifically targeting the Hutu population, includ-
ing women and children (Lemarchand, 1996, pp. 120-
127). Casualties numbered around 20,000, according to 
Human Rights Watch (2009).  
These atrocities compounded risk in two main 
ways. First, they caused mass displacement, in particu-
lar resulting in growing refugee numbers in Tanzania. It 
was amongst the refugee community that Hutu militias 
gained strength. Chief among these were the Parti 
pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (Palipehutu), which 
had emerged in the diaspora community in Tanzania 
after the 1972 mass killings. Hutu groups that initially 
provoked unrest in 1988 were organized by Palipehutu. 
Palipehutu were committed to overthrowing the 
Uprona government, and seeking retribution for the 
1972 killings (Uvin, 2009, pp. 11-12). Consequently, 
they were not interested in power sharing options that 
could arise from a process of democratization, thus 
viewing democratization as a threat to their own pow-
er. Second, these two atrocities were instrumental in 
further entrenching cleavages between Hutus and Tut-
sis, already salient as a result of decades of discrimina-
tion and disenfranchisement. With a Tutsi-led military 
at one end of the spectrum, and Hutu militia groups at 
the other end, the space for moderate Hutu and Tutsi 
elites appeared fraught from the outset. While the 
1988 atrocities spurred Buyoya to reform Burundi’s po-
litical landscape, and ultimately embark on democrati-
zation, as Lemarchand points out, it also resulted in a 
“further hardening of ethnic lines” (1994, p. 590). As 
Burundi was about to embark on its democratic transi-
tion, ethnic tensions were becoming more pro-
nounced. 
Thus, up until the early 1990s, Burundi’s history 
was one of political repression, in which the Tutsi-
dominated military regime discriminated against Hu-
tus, and treated dissent with extreme violence. In oth-
er words, Burundi’s first three decades of independ-
ence were marked by repressive rule, widespread 
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discrimination, and atrocities. Hutu refugee camps in 
Tanzania had spawned militia groups such as the Pali-
pehutu, while Tutsi refugees from Rwanda had spurred 
Tutsi elites in Burundi to take a hard line against Hutus. 
Burundi’s democratic conducting of free and fair 
elections in 1993 followed a five-year period of liberali-
zation. While there was international pressure for Bu-
rundi to democratize, particularly coming from interna-
tional donors (Snyder, 2000, p. 300), to initiate 
democratic reform the political will on the part of Buy-
oya and others in the government, was also strong. Fol-
lowing the 1988 atrocities, Buyoya enacted a number 
of new policies designed to give greater freedom to all 
of Burundi’s citizens. He included more Hutus in the 
government, appointing a Hutu prime minister; he in-
troduced a Charter of National Unity, which sought to 
lift discrimination experienced by Hutus. Most im-
portantly, he introduced a new constitution, which in-
cluded provisions that placed clear limits on executive 
power, established the importance of human rights, 
and sanctioned a multi-party democracy (Lemarchand, 
1996, p. 131). The constitution was put to a referen-
dum in 1992 with an overwhelming majority voting in 
its favour (African Elections Database, 2015). Thus, it 
was during Buyoya’s tenure that the exclusion of Hutus 
in government and the public sector began to receive 
redress. Indeed, with the raft of liberalization measures 
that took place between 1988 and 1993, the country’s 
return to free and fair elections was the culmination of 
five years of preparation.  
However, this push for reform did not put an end to 
tensions that had remained high after the 1988 atroci-
ties. Instead, between 1988 and 1993, inter-ethnic ten-
sions escalated. Burundi’s economic decline contribut-
ed to these tensions. From the late 1980s the country 
endured negative growth and increasing debt, which in 
no small part was due to a drop in the price of coffee; 
and imposed structural adjustment policies exacerbat-
ed inequalities (Uvin, 2009, p. 11). Pressure from refu-
gee communities also mounted. Burundi’s neighbour-
ing countries had been accommodating mostly Hutu 
refugees since the atrocities in 1972. In 1991 the esti-
mated refugee population was 240,000, mostly living in 
Tanzania. With limited resources available, it proved to 
be prohibitively costly—only a few thousand were re-
patriated prior to 1993 (Lemarchand, 1996, pp. 172-
173). Complicating things further, some members of 
the repatriated populations engaged in anti-
government violence in late 1991, further deepening 
the tension that had already existed (Lemarchand, 
1996, p. 173).  
In addition to this, the 1993 campaign further ag-
gravated tensions between Hutus and Tutsis. During 
the campaign, electoral competition was characterized 
by two major parties—the Hutu-supported Front pour 
la Démocratie au Burundi (Frodebu), and the incum-
bent Tutsi-led Uprona. Many Tutsis who attempted to 
join Frodebu were often branded as traitors, and were 
the target of physical intimidation by Uprona support-
ers (Reyntjens, 2005, p. 10). Palipehutu’s members also 
sought to further aggravate tensions—the militia in-
creased its infiltrations from Tanzania, while rumours 
of the army’s plans to retaliate with brutal force began 
to abound (Uvin, 2009, p. 12). Palipehutu’s professed 
goal of Hutu domination, along with its attempts to 
undermine democratic reform resulted in it not receiv-
ing legal recognition as a political party in the lead-up 
to the elections, which prompted them to further esca-
late tensions through demonstrations and terrorist at-
tacks (Prunier, 1994, p. 16). In response, many Pali-
pehutu members joined Frodebu, a move which 
spurred Uprona to accuse the party of being the “legal 
arm” of Palipehutu. The presence of Palipehutu within 
Frodebu further cemented this ethnic polarisation in 
the lead-up to the 1993 election; and indeed, after the 
election, many local Frodebu leaders throughout the 
country were also Palipehutu militants (Reyntjens, 
2005, p. 10).  
At the same time, the one sector that Buyoya was 
not able to influence in terms of personnel, was the 
army, meaning that the security sector, which had 
wielded considerable power, remained under the con-
trol of Bururi Tutsis. The military defied changes that 
Buyoya had initiated to facilitate democratization—
there were unsuccessful coup attempts in 1989 and 
1992, reflecting the increasingly obstructive role that 
the security sector were playing (Reyntjens, 1993, p. 
565). While the military’s chief of staff publicly en-
dorsed the newly elected president Ndadaye, following 
the 1993 election, mistrust between the army and the 
new government remained high (Reyntjens, 1993, p. 
578). Burundi’s internal security was becoming harder 
to manage.  
The election in July yielded a predictable outcome. 
Frodebu received nearly two thirds of the vote, effec-
tively ending thirty years of Tutsi rule. In a spirit of rap-
prochement, following the precedent set by Buyoya af-
ter 1988, the new president, Ndadaye included a 
number of Tutsi representatives in the new cabinet, 
not dissimilar from that of Buyoya from the late 1980s. 
With the peaceful change of power, Burundi’s transi-
tion initially inspired great optimism. However, it was 
at the lower levels of governance that rapid change of 
personnel took place—provincial governors and com-
munal leaders were almost entirely replaced by Frode-
bu cadres (Uvin, 2009, p. 13). For the military, the con-
cern of the rapid Frodebu’ization of the government 
(and fears the military would be next) spurred an at-
tempted coup in October 1993. 
The coup that was instigated by the eleventh bat-
talion of the army (and joined by other elements) was 
ultimately unsuccessful in establishing a new govern-
ment, but violence soon followed in the ensuing chaos. 
The battalion apprehended Ndadaye, as well as the 
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president and vice-president of the national assembly, 
assassinating them soon after. Other members of the 
government sought refuge with the French embassy, 
demanding international protection in the wake of the 
attempted coup. With the government in hiding, and 
the army rejecting any request for foreign involvement, 
the ensuing violence unfolded in a power vacuum (Rey-
tnjens, 2005, p. 14). The assassination of Ndadaye pro-
voked an immediate reaction throughout Burundi. 
Many Frodebu officials—ostensibly Palipehutu mem-
bers—organized retaliatory violence against Tutsis, and 
prepared to mount a resistance against the army by 
blocking roads and destroying bridges. As in 1972 and 
1988, the army also responded, engaging in wide-
spread killing, committing “widespread and indiscrimi-
nate repression of ordinary Hutu peasants” (Prunier, 
1994, p. 24; Reyntjens, 2005, p. 14; Uvin, 1999, p. 262). 
Violence committed on both sides resulted in the kill-
ing more than 50,000, and displacing up to one million 
people (Reyntjens, 2005, p. 14; Uvin, 1999, p. 262). Ex-
tremist actors on both sides stepped up attack and 
counter-attack.  
While some order was regained in 1994 with a 
compromise government (consisting of Uprona and 
Frodebu elements), this soon fell apart after the new 
president (Ntyamira) was killed in the plane crashed 
that also killed the Rwandan president Habyarimana, 
triggering the genocide there. Although Uprona and 
Frodebu managed to agree on an equal number of 
ministries by the end of 1994, the new government 
was marred by growing factional division between the 
two parties, rendering the government unable to func-
tion. Eventually another coup was instigated in 1996, 
this time initiated by Buyoya. Once again, a similar pat-
tern of violence followed—Hutu militias attacked Tutsi 
militia groups and army barracks, pre-empting what 
was perceived to be an inevitable return to anti-Hutu 
violence. Tutsi militia groups, and the army then terror-
ized the Hutu population, engaging in disproportionate 
reprisal attacks (Uvin, 1999, pp. 262-263; Uvin, 2009, 
pp. 14-15). Tensions were further escalated by un-
checked hate propaganda—printed publications often 
incited anti-Hutu violence, and even printed the names 
of Hutu government workers to be targeted (Uvin, 
1999, p. 262). By 1998 the violence claimed the lives of 
more than 200,000, and by the 2006 truce up to 
400,000 lives were lost, with 800,000 having fled the 
country (Wolpe, 2011, p. 5).  
In accounting for why civil war and widespread 
atrocities were committed during the transition, risk 
factors associated with transitions need consideration. 
The first is executive power. Given the peaceful change 
of office that occurred after the election, executive 
power appeared to be functioning as it was meant to in 
the new democracy. However, factional division was 
still a salient issue, despite the efforts of both Buyoya’s 
government and the nascent Ndadaye regime, two fac-
tors need further exploration—the continuing factional 
divisions that characterized the violence; and the 
weakening of moderate Hutu and Tusti elites as ten-
sions escalated.  
Yet this factional division itself was complex. Within 
the government, there appeared to be greater inter-
identity cooperation than ever before. Both the previ-
ous and new governments demonstrated an explicit in-
tention to ensure that both Tutsi and Hutu representa-
tives were included. Buyoya’s Third Republic 
government comprised equal numbers of Hutus and 
Tutsis, as did Ndadaye’s 1993 government. On the sur-
face, the growing inclusivity of the government seemed 
to address previous grievances based on Hutu exclu-
sion. However, given the extent to which Hutus had 
been deprived of public sector positions since the 
1960s, it was the new government’s attempt to re-
balance personnel in these areas (and the public pres-
sure to do so), which led to elements within the mili-
tary elites once again marginalizing moderates on both 
sides, and initiating another coup. The military was the 
only sector that Buyoya was not able to touch, during 
his efforts to rebalance political representation and re-
cruitment within the government. The military itself 
was not simply disproportionately controlled by Tut-
sis—its leadership was controlled by Tutsis from Bururi. 
Thus, the threat that the democratic transition posed 
for military elites was not simply a manifestation of Hu-
tu-Tutsi tensions, rather it was the threat to the hold of 
power enjoyed by Bururi Tutsis in particular.  
The atrocities committed in late 1993 and early 
1994 were the product of a complex array of structural 
risk factors, escalating tensions, and triggered by the 
attempted coup in which Ndadaye and other newly 
elected elites were assassinated. The long-term dis-
crimination and repression of Hutus by the Uprona re-
gime in Burundi was the primary driving factor behind 
the articulation of political competition along ethnic 
lines during the beginning of transition away from au-
thoritarian rule. Prior atrocities in 1972 and 1988 com-
pounded these grievances, and created a large diaspo-
ra population in neighbouring countries, from which 
extremist Hutu militias emerged. Principal among them 
was Palipehutu. It was no surprise that the major con-
tender, alongside the incumbent Uprona was a pre-
dominately Hutu party, Frodebu. During the campaign, 
tensions between supporters of both parties were fur-
ther aggravated by two things—the physical intimida-
tion of Tutsis who actively supported Frodebu, and the 
infiltration of Palipehutu members within the ranks of 
Frodebu. Although the initial election went relatively 
smoothly, the entrenched Tutsi elite became threat-
ened by replacement of personnel with Hutus. Alt-
hough cabinet initially included many Tutsis, at lower 
levels within government departments, there almost 
all positions changed hands to Frodebu supporters. 
Many newly appointed officials in the provinces were 
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members of Palipehutu, whose professed aim was ret-
ribution for past atrocities. Burundi’s military was both 
indisciplined and increasingly concerned about the 
Frodebu’ization of the public sector. An attempted 
coup by one battalion, and the ensuing assassination of 
Ndadaye triggered an immediate reaction in provinces 
throughout the country, much of which was organized 
by local officials who had ties with Palipehutu. This saw 
Hutus attacking Tutsis. The military then responded, 
with widespread killing of Hutus. 
3.2. Guyana 
Guyana embarked on a transition away from authori-
tarian rule in 1992, with the holding of the country’s 
first free and fair elections since 1964. Prior to this, the 
country contained three long-term risk factors associ-
ated with mass atrocities. The first is politicized tension 
between the country’s two largest identity groups—
African Guyanese and Indian Guyanese. Second, during 
the period of one party dominance between 1964 and 
1992, Indian Guyanese endured state-led discrimina-
tion, including disenfranchisement, unequal access to 
public sector positions, particularly in the country’s po-
lice and military. Political opponents were also dispro-
portionately targeted by the African Guyanese-
dominated police. Third, while the country did not en-
dure violence on the scale that Burundi did, Indian 
Guyanese citizens were subject to widespread violence 
in 1963 and 1964 after uprisings throughout the coun-
try triggered a repressive response from the military, 
resulting in what Perry Mars has labelled “near-
genocidal warfare” (2001, p. 260). Although this vio-
lence (less than 1000 civilian deaths) was on a much 
smaller scale than what had occurred in Burundi—both 
in 1972 and 1988—this episode nonetheless under-
scored tensions between both groups over the ensuing 
decades. Not surprisingly, these tensions found expres-
sion in political competition during the resumption of 
multi-party elections in 1992, with the defeat of the in-
cumbent African Guyanese People’s National Congress 
(PNC) to the Asian Guyanese dominated People’s Pro-
gressive Party/Civic (PPP/C). 
Guyana’s first three decades of independence were 
characterized by tensions between the country’s two 
major identity groups—African Guyanese and Asian 
Guyanese. Guyana’s African population were trans-
ported to South America as slaves during Dutch coloni-
al control in the 17th and 18th centuries. Under British 
control slavery was declared illegal in 1836. The coloni-
al administration in Guyana imported indentured la-
bourers from the Indian subcontinent to replace for-
mer slaves in the sugar cane plantations (Hinds, 2010, 
p. 1). This new wave of Asian migration was a cynical 
move to subvert the prohibition of slavery—the new 
migrants earned marginally more than the African 
slaves had before. The administrators forbade the new-
ly liberated African slaves from owning property or en-
gaging in commerce, thus further entrenching their pov-
erty. What unfolded was a duel tiered hierarchy of ex-
ploitation, with the newer migrants only slightly better 
off than the former group. This inevitably triggered ten-
sions, and prompted both groups to organize politically 
to empower their own (see Wilson, 2012, pp. 77-78). 
Tension between African and Indian Guyanese 
communities was further fuelled by the British colonial 
rule in the post-war period. Whenever one community 
staged an uprising, the British administrators tended to 
recruit members of the other community to suppress 
them (Mars, 2009, p. 508). When the British introduced 
universal suffrage in 1953, it retained control of the se-
curity forces. With the election of Cheddi Jagan and his 
socialist (and initially multi-racial but Indian-dominated) 
PPP, the colonial overseers suspended the constitution 
and maintained order through the African-dominated 
police force, under the command of British officers 
(Jagan, 1997, pp. 124-131; Mars, 2009, p. 510). With 
the PPP splitting after the 1957 election, African Guya-
nese leader Forbes Burnham formed the PNC, with po-
litical competition emerging along distinct ethnic lines. 
Election-related tensions increased, and the African-
dominated security sector became increasingly at odds 
with the Indian Guyanese dominated government. Pri-
or to independence, the British changed the electoral 
system from “first past the post” to proportional vot-
ing. This gave the “capitalist” PNC the edge in the 1964 
election; successive elections beyond independence in 
1966 maintained this status quo (until 1992) through a 
series of rigged elections. Under Burnham, the African-
dominated armed forces enjoyed a close relationship, 
to the extent that they pledged allegiance to Burnham 
and the PNC, rather than the country. The combination 
of a minority-led government and a security sector do-
ing the bidding of that government has strong parallels 
with the authoritarian system in Burundi. 
Indeed, the political dominance of the PNC be-
tween 1964 and 1992 was supported by the African 
Guyanese-dominated military and police. The role the 
security sector played in support of the PNC govern-
ment was particularly apparent in the aftermath of 
elections, which were typically flawed. Disputed elec-
tion results often triggered post-election protests by 
Indian Guyanese PPP supporters, and these were fre-
quently met with brutal repression by the police force. 
Opposition and authority in Guyana had a clear ethnic 
dimension—political protests were largely Indian Guy-
anese in character, and were usually repressed (often 
violently) by African security forces. In order to main-
tain its hold on power, the PNC invested heavily in the 
security sector, making Guyana the most militarized 
state in the Caribbean. As Hinds states, the implication 
was that the coercive apparatus of the state, under the 
control of the African Guyanese, functioned as a tool of 
African ethnic domination (2010, p. 41). 
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Political power since independence in 1966 has 
been characterized by competition and tension be-
tween African Guyanese—roughly 30 per cent of the 
population—and Indian Guyanese—comprising ap-
proximately 43.5 per cent (Wilson, 2012, p. 88). Be-
tween 19648 and 1992, Guyana was ruled ostensibly by 
an authoritarian regime controlled by the predomi-
nantly African Guyanese People’s National Congress 
(PNC). As in Burundi, PNC supporters controlled gov-
ernment institutions during this period (Wilson, 2012, 
pp. 82-85). This control of government by a minority-
led party fuelled tensions between government sup-
porters and Indian Guyanese, who were mostly PPP 
supporters. The PPP was initially a socialist party that 
attracted support from both main groups, but dissatis-
faction by some African Guyanese members at what 
they perceived as an imbalance in the leadership, 
spurred the formation of the PNC. Electoral competi-
tion became a zero-sum game, with the PPP and the 
PNC promoting policies that benefitted their ethnic 
supporter bases. Following a PPP victory in the 1961 
elections, victory marches turned violent as their sup-
porters levelled racial insults at Africans in the street. 
This then led to violent attacks against Africans in Indi-
an-dominated villages; and the following year, many 
Indian Guyanese came under attack in Georgetown as 
tensions rose (Hinds, 2010, pp. 9-10). Violence escalat-
ed after the colonial administrators changed the elec-
toral system to proportional representation, a move 
which saw the fortunes of the more favoured PNC rise 
against the socialist PPP. This underscored the identity-
based violence, which grew as the territory moved to-
wards independence.  
The violence that erupted at this time was not on a 
scale that comes close to the atrocities committed in 
Burundi. Despite this, a violent episode in the 1960s 
compounded inter-ethnic tensions and made rap-
prochement and cooperation more difficult in the en-
suing decades. In 1963 and 1964, the ethnic violence 
that erupted resulted in hundreds of deaths and wide-
spread damage to property (Mars, 2001, p. 360). Fol-
lowing PNC control of the government from 1966, a lit-
any of repressive attacks were committed against 
Indian Guyanese at strikes and political protests. Brutal 
tactics instigated by the African-dominated police 
against largely Asian protesters was the pattern of vio-
lence to follow, particularly during the years of PNC 
government control. One impact of this inter-ethnic 
conflict, particularly the violence that occurred on the 
eve of independence, was to drive a physical wedge 
between these two communities. Multi-ethnic villages 
                                                          
8 This was two years before independence, but this election 
heralded the government which would steward the territory to 
self-rule. Prior to this, in 1953, the British administrators intro-
duced democratic representation through a colonial legislative 
council. The two major parties were formed in this period. 
were commonplace, but after 1964 these diverse 
communities no longer existed due to the migration of 
ethnic communities. This saw the homogenization of re-
gions and communities (Mars, 2001, p. 361). Not only 
did tensions remain high, but social cohesion suffered. 
During the period of one-party rule by the PNC, 
from 1964 to 1992, Indian Guyanese citizens were sub-
jected to exclusion and discrimination. In successive 
elections between 1966 and 1992, the PNC held onto 
power by conducting fraudulent elections (Hinds, 2010, 
pp. 11-17). This helped the PNC remain in power for 
more than two decades, despite the PPP having the 
backing of the more numerically dominant Indian pop-
ulation. One of the consequences of this was the fa-
vouring of Africans in the bureaucracy and security 
forces. Although the PNC ensured that the cabinet re-
mained diverse, with representations from the Indian 
Guyanese community, the criteria for employment in 
the state sector became ethnicity as well as party affilia-
tion. This was especially apparent within both the army 
and the military, where there were few Indian Guyanese 
represented (Hinds, 2010, p. 49; Wilson, 2012, p. 95). 
Given these risk factors, it is not surprising that the 
introduction of free and fair elections in 1992 heralded 
political competition characterized by ethnic differ-
ence. Guyana’s shift away from authoritarian rule was 
accompanied by ethnic-based factional division, which 
was reflected by the ethnic character of the two major 
parties. Because the Indian Guyanese population was 
larger in number than the African Guyanese, free and 
fair elections would inevitably herald a change of gov-
ernment. Yet the ranks of the police force and the mili-
tary continued to be dominated by African Guyanese. 
Although the PPP attempted to broaden its appeal be-
yond its ethnic base by rebranding itself as PPP/Civic 
(PPP/C), the two major parties were still distinctly di-
vided along ethnic lines. This time, the PPP/C’s larger 
support base saw it victorious at the elections, herald-
ing the presidency of Cheddi Jagan. Tensions between 
the two parties have also continued to simmer ever 
since, with the PNC supporters refusing to recognize 
the election results, and taking to the streets to pro-
test. Between 1992 and 2001 in particular, election cy-
cles were accompanied by low-level street violence 
(Hinds, 2010, pp. 23-25).  
While Burundi’s transition was stalled from the be-
ginning through a violent backlash instigated by the 
Tutsi-led military, Guyana’s relatively peaceful transi-
tion was by no means assured. In both countries rapid 
and widespread changes to personnel within the public 
sector took place. During the period of authoritarian 
rule between 1966 and 1992, public offices, police and 
military were dominated by African Guyanese, but de-
clared their allegiance to the PNC first and foremost. 
So, in 1992, Guyana’s democratic transition saw an Af-
rican Guyanese dominated government (that had filled 
virtually all positions of public power with people of Af-
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rican background) on the verge of losing far more than 
an election. To compound these tensions, the after the 
victorious PPP gained power in the 1992 election, they 
“initiated a program of witch-hunting against top civil 
servants suspected of PNC sympathies” (Hinds, 2010, p. 
21), much in the same way that Frodebu did.  
Yet inter-ethnic tensions in Guyana simmered with-
out dangerously escalating. Here, two sources of resili-
ence had a positive impact. The first is the cooperation 
of the armed forces with the new government. Be-
tween 1985 and 1992, the security forces within Guy-
ana—most importantly, the military and the police—
evolved from being a supporter of the PNC, to partici-
pating in the transition process, and supporting the 
newly elected government. Although African Guyanese 
comprised 90 per cent of the armed forces, the military 
cooperated with the PPP/C government, allaying fears 
that they would instigate a coup. As Hinds states, “the 
upper echelons of the forces remain loyal to the gov-
ernment of the day” (2010, p. 41).  
How did the armed forces—previously a tool for 
the PNC government—defer to the PPP/C government 
despite the new government’s promise to reform the 
police and the army? One answer to this can be found 
in the action of the successor to Forbes Burnham, who 
died in office in 1985. His successor, Desmond Hoyte, 
came to power at a time when international pressure 
for Guyana to democratize was growing (Griffith, 
1997a, p. 158; Wilson, 2012, p. 84). Hoyte was initially 
a supporter of Burnham’s vision, but after becoming 
president, he determined that Burnham’s leadership 
had been profoundly flawed, and that many of his 
“prescriptions and initiatives” had failed (Griffith, 1991, 
p. 150; Griffith, 1997b, p. 270). This, coupled with in-
ternational pressure, prompted Hoyte to initiate a raft 
of reforms to facilitate democratization, improve hu-
man rights, and improve Guyana’s stagnant economy 
(Griffith, 1997b, p. 270). The first step was to change 
the relationship between the PNC and the government. 
Prior to Hoyte’s tenure, all branches of government 
had played a subordinate role to the PNC. Hoyte ended 
government funding of the PNC, and in doing so weak-
ened the party’s hold on the government (Griffith, 
1997b, p. 270). He then reshuffled ministerial portfolios, 
demoted ministers who had been closely aligned with 
Burnham, (Griffith, 1997b, p. 270). This paved the way 
for the resumption of free and fair elections in 1992. 
Given the close alignment between his predecessor 
and the armed forces, the question of how the armed 
forces would accommodate democratic change was a 
prescient one. Indeed there were lingering concerns—
both domestically and internationally—that the mili-
tary still retained their loyalty to the PNC, and might 
declare martial law during the 1992 campaign, in order 
to facilitate a PNC victory (Griffith, 1997b, p. 275). 
Hoyte took advantage of the retirement of Major-
General Norman McLean, controversially placing an In-
dian Guyanese officer—Joseph Singh—as acting Chief 
of Staff of the Guyana Defence Forces. Singh became 
the first Indian Guyanese to be head of the defence 
forces (Griffith, 1991, p. 152). In addition, he repealed 
the National Security Act. The Act, introduced in 1966 
allowed for detention without charge for up to three 
months of anyone who was deemed to be acting in a 
way “prejudicial to public safety or public order.” Alt-
hough it had never been used, its presence had been a 
source of fear, particularly among opposition support-
ers (Griffith, 1991, p. 154). 
Hoyte appointed another man of Indian descent—
Balrum Raghubir—as Police Commissioner (Griffith, 
1991, p. 152; Guyana Times, 2014). In 1989, Hoyte also 
introduced the Police Complaints Authority Act, in or-
der to address nearly three decades of unchecked po-
lice brutality, levelled primarily at the Indian Guyanese 
population. Complaints were made public, and dozens 
were investigated each year. In 1989, for example, five 
police officers were charged with manslaughter after a 
death-in-custody case (Griffith, 1991, p. 154). Hoyte 
not only changed the leadership of the police, but also 
increased its transparency and accountability.  
Hoyte’s proactive move to bring about these 
changes precluded any potential internal resistance 
that might have arisen from a succeeding Indian Guya-
nese head of state attempting the same changes. 
While the armed forces was predominantly populated 
by people of African descent, the multi-ethnic charac-
ter of the highest ranks was instrumental in ensuring 
that it was loyal to the democratically elected govern-
ment, rather than the PNC specifically. This change of 
culture at the highest level had a strong effect on the 
political stability of the country during its democratic 
transition. According to Griffith, Hoyte’s decision to 
change leadership in the police and the army prior to 
democratic elections in 1992, was crucial to the securi-
ty forces going beyond their previously narrow alle-
giance to the PNC government (Griffith, 1997b, p. 275). 
In addition, Guyana did not have a history of military 
coups, unlike Burundi. In Burundi, the military had on 
numerous occasions initiate military coups to change 
leaders. By contrast, the security sector in Guyana had 
previously supported the PNC government, but had 
never enacted regime change through a coup. As such, 
the military in Guyana did not have the same ubiqui-
tous hold over power that the military did in Burundi. 
Nevertheless, it was Hoyte’s foresight that concluded 
that the strong relationship between his PNC govern-
ment and the military needed to be addressed prior to 
the introduction of democratic elections, and he did 
this in the only way practically possible—by changing 
the leadership. It was impossible to alter the entire 
composition of the army and the police in a few short 
years, but greater diversity at the elite level saw a 
change in culture that precipitated a support of the 
elected government, which would inevitably be PPP-
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led. Having heads of police and army that understood 
and supported this transition was crucial to Guyana’s 
transition (Griffith, 1997b, p. 275). 
However, the security forces’ elite-level support for 
the new government did not precipitate a major 
change in culture through the rank and file. The majori-
ty of soldiers and polices continue to be comprised of 
African Guyanese, which has had implications especial-
ly for police-community relations. Many Indian Guya-
nese continue to place little trust in the police to pro-
vide public safety, which has led to many Indian 
businesses hiring private security firms to protect them 
from criminal activity (Mars, 2009, p. 514). There are 
numerous vigilante groups that are active in the coun-
try—some of which have been accused of “indulging in 
physical and verbal abuse of citizens” (Mars, 2009, p. 
515). While Hoyte’s change of leadership both in the 
Disciplined Forces and the Guyana Police Force was in-
strumental in the security sector supporting the demo-
cratic change of regime in 1992, identity-based ten-
sions between the police and the community continue. 
The second source of resilience is the existence of 
popular counter-narratives to the ethnic divide, in the 
form of broad-based alternative political parties. In ad-
dition to these two parties, two small but significant 
minority parties have influenced the national of politi-
cal competition. The Working People’s Alliance (WPA), 
was a class-based party, appealing to the working class 
of all ethnic groups in the country. Formed originally in 
1974, it remained active after 1992, winning approxi-
mately 2 per cent of votes in the 1992, 1997 and 2001 
elections (Trefs, 2005, pp. 366-368). The Alliance for 
Change (AFC) was formed in 2005. It too was multi-
ethnic in appeal, and advocated a reform ticket, which 
attracted 8.1 per cent of the votes at the 2006 election 
(Wilson, pp. 87-88), and 10.3 per cent in the 2011 elec-
tion, securing seven seats (out of sixty-seven) in the 
parliament (BBC, 2011).  
Both parties were influential in the way that they 
offered counter-narratives to ethnocentrism of the two 
major parties. By doing so, they challenged both par-
ties to also broaden their appeals. The PPP/C had al-
ready attempted this with its “Civic” wing. The PNC’s 
reaction to both the PPP/C’s rise to power, and the 
growing popularity of alternative parties was to also 
broaden its appeal by trying to win a portion of the In-
dian vote. This did this by establishing a “Reform” wing, 
which included the membership of prominent Amerin-
dians (Wilson, 2012, p. 36). PNC/R went on to form a 
coalition called A Partnership for National Union (AP-
NU), which the AFC joined prior to the 2015 election. 
The APNU presented a more diverse membership, and 
advocated a “celebration of ethnic diversity” to under-
pin their governance (APNU & AFC, 2015). At the 2015 
election APNU won a majority of seats, precipitating 
the first change of government since the 1992 election 
(BBC, 2015). Thus, once the former PNC moved beyond 
its appeal as an African Guyanese party to incorporate 
a broader support base, political competition moved 
beyond its initial bipolar character. The AFC’s multi-
ethnic support base—and its counter-narrative to the 
largely mono-ethnic identity of the two major parties—
was instrumental in this shift. The importance of this 
counter-narrative can be seen in the way that it pro-
vided a more inclusive vision of political participation. 
Previous research on factors that inhibit risk associated 
with mass atrocities has pointed out that governments 
and leaders who foster an inclusive ideology—
transcending identity-based divisions—can have a 
strong impact on the mitigation of risk associated with 
mass atrocities (Mayersen & McLoughlin, 2011, p. 251; 
McLoughlin, 2014, p. 157; Straus, 2012, p. 357). 
Guyana’s period of democratization is not without 
its challenges. Cheddi Jagan’s initial promise to contin-
ue reforms after the 1992 election stalled once he won 
office. Subsequent PPP/C-led governments (under the 
presidencies of Janet Jagan, Bharrat Jagdeo and Donald 
Ramotar) became more authoritarian in character (Wil-
son, 2012, p. 97). However, the security forces’ loyalty 
to the government of the day ensured that a popularly 
elected government would not be brought down by a 
coup. This represented a significant change in culture 
within the armed forces, which itself was a product of 
the foresight of Desmond Hoyte. In addition, no identi-
ty group in Guyana holds an absolute majority in terms 
of population, unlike the Hutus in Burundi. For Guyana 
this has opened up the possibility of other counter-
narratives in the political discourse, led to the election 
of a multi-ethnic coalition in 2015. 
4. Conclusion 
Since the introduction of free and fair elections in 1992 
and 1993 respectively, the fates of Guyana and Burundi 
could not be more different. Yet neither the atrocities 
in Burundi, nor the relative stability in Guyana were in-
evitable from the outset. While Guyana has avoided 
large-scale violence, tensions remain high, and sporad-
ic political violence still occurs (Hinds, 2010, p. x). Risk 
is still salient in Guyana—more than two decades of 
democracy has not entirely eliminated tensions be-
tween the two main groups. Burundi’s transition took 
place in a much more volatile environment, yet the vio-
lence that escalated in late 1993 was triggered by a 
relatively obscure leader of one battalion in the mili-
tary. The military itself was not subject to changes in 
personnel in the years leading up to 1993, in contrast 
to the rest of the public sector. Indeed, at independ-
ence, Burundi’s prospects looked bright, with Uprona 
effectively representing both Hutus and Tutsis, under 
the country’s royal head of state. Guyana entered in-
dependence following inter-ethnic violence, and a 
deeply divided political landscape. In accounting for 
why the move away from authoritarian rule in Burundi 
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led to widespread atrocities, while similar tensions in 
Guyana did not escalate violently, this analysis yields 
three key observations. 
First, Burundi’s unstable neighbourhood and past 
atrocities exacerbated risk considerably. A history of 
atrocities and repression led to highly charged diaspora 
communities of displaced Hutus in Tanzania and 
Rwanda, forming militias, seeking to overthrow the 
Tutsi-led government. The instability and escalating vi-
olence in Rwanda further heightened the perceived 
threat to security that the Tutsi elites experienced. By 
contrast, Guyana’s history of African dominance was 
not characterized by the same level of violence. Alt-
hough there was inter-ethnic violence on the eve of in-
dependence, subsequent anti-government resistance 
was mostly voiced through non-violent protests. Harff’s 
claim that prior atrocities are a significant risk factor 
for future atrocities holds true in these two cases. 
Second, political competition in Guyana had anoth-
er significant dimension during transition. While the re-
turn to free and fair elections certainly heightened ten-
sions between those of African and those of Indian 
descent, non-ethnic alternatives were always visible. 
During Burnham’s tenure, the multi-ethnic WPA pro-
vided a counter narrative to the ethnic divide between 
government and opposition. The AFC later emerged as 
the main alternative, growing in popularity to win more 
than 10 per cent of the vote in 2011, and subsequently 
forming part of a winning coalition in 2015. Such coun-
ter narratives not only provided an alternative for the 
voting public, but they also pressured the two main 
parties to broaden their own support bases, thus mod-
erating their rhetoric and images. While counter narra-
tives were also initially present in Burundi in the early 
years of independence,9 the purging of Hutus from the 
police force and Uprona, and the military coup in 1966 
established Tutsi dominance in both the government 
and the security forces. During the return to multi-
party elections in 1993, only Frodebu and Uprona won 
seats in parliament, although a small number of minor 
parties also contested (EISA, 2010). The extent to 
which the demographic breakdown in both countries 
contributed to different political outcomes warrants 
further research. Guyana’s population of indigenous 
and other groups comprised a strong support base for 
the AFC; and the fact that both Indian Guyanese and 
African Guyanese communities comprised less than 
half of the population meant that no group could rely 
on their own ethnic base alone to secure an outright 
electoral majority. Burundi’s population is less diverse, 
and more bipolar in character. Yet this alone does not 
                                                          
9 Two examples stand out. At independence, Burundi was ini-
tially a constitutional monarchy, with the monarchy comprising 
of Ganwa—a princely class that was neither Tutsi nor Hutu. 
And prior to the 1966 coup, Uprona comprised both Hutus and 
Tutsi, with the first prime minister being a Hutu. 
account for the perpetration of atrocities in 1993. Bu-
rundi’s pre-colonial history was largely stable, with a 
monarchical structure that transcended this division. It 
is also clear during Burundi’s transition that extremists 
on both sides played influential roles, further polarizing 
electoral competition, and lessening the possibility of 
cooperation rapprochement.  
Third, and most significantly is the similarity in the 
state of the armed forces in both countries at the ad-
vent of democratic transition. Both countries had been 
ruled by minority-led governments with the overt sup-
port of the military. In Burundi, the Tutsi-led military 
had power over the government, and was responsible 
for crushing dissent in the most extreme ways, even 
committing genocide in 1972. In Guyana, the military 
and police comprised predominantly of African Guya-
nese. During the period of autocratic rule between 
1966 and 1992, it effectively functioned “as a tool of 
African ethnic domination” (Hinds, 2010, p. 41). It was 
frequently deployed to counter opposition move-
ments, which were largely comprised of Indian Guya-
nese (Hinds, 2010, p. 11). Yet in Guyana, the shift of 
power from the PNC to the Indian-dominated PPP in 
1992, did not trigger a military coup and targeted vio-
lence as it did in Burundi. Instead, after the defeat of 
the incumbent PNC in 1992, the armed forces re-
mained loyal to the new government. Indeed the Guy-
anese armed forces underwent a significant change in 
culture at the elite level—from being subject principal-
ly to Burnham and the PNC, prior to 1985, to being sub-
ject to the country as a whole. This change was 
brought about by Desmond Hoyte, prior to the 1992 
elections. In his efforts to add greater balance to the 
public sector and government, he made the crucial de-
cision to appoint new (Indian Guyanese) leaders in 
both the Guyanese Police Force, and the Disciplined 
Forces. Yet the extent to which this change of leader-
ship affected cooperation with the Disciplined forces 
demands further scrutiny. More research is needed in-
to precisely how the Disciplined Forces transitioned 
from a staunch supporter of the authoritarian PNC 
government, to a more transparent and accountable 
institution. In particular, more research is needed to at-
tain a better understanding of the extent to which the 
chief of staff himself changed the culture of the Disci-
plined Forces. 
Similar changes to personnel within government 
and the public sector were implemented by Buyoya 
prior to the 1993 elections. Crucially, he did not make 
any changes to the military. While it would have been 
impossible to overhaul the composition of the military 
in such a short time, the case of Guyana provides an il-
lustration of the impact that strategic changes to the 
armed forces at the elite level can have.  
This article’s comparative analysis of the early stag-
es of transition in both Guyana and Burundi highlights 
the ways that pre-existing identity-based tensions can 
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escalate in the form of multi-party political competi-
tion. The processes of risk mitigation in Guyana were 
not a panacea to these tensions, but understanding 
them is insightful in better understanding how such 
tensions can be managed over time. A combination of 
elite-driven reform and popular (and inclusive) coun-
ter-narratives to the old identity-based divisions pro-
vided pressure valves during a volatile period of 
change. New leadership in the security forces helped to 
facilitate a change of culture at the top, towards sup-
porting a democratically elected government, rather 
than simply being loyal to the former PNC government. 
In Burundi, the continuity of dominance that the military 
maintained into 1993, ensured that the perpetrators of 
much of the past atrocities maintained their power. Po-
litical reform without a change of culture within the mili-
tary put them and the Frodebu government at odds with 
each other, with devastating consequences.  
This analysis provides a glimpse of the contributing 
factors of risk escalation and risk mitigation when simi-
lar key variables are at play. Improving our understand-
ing of both why atrocities occur, and how mass atrocity 
risk is mitigated during democratic transition, yields in-
sights for prevention, both in terms of some of the 
principal actors responsible for avoiding risk escalation, 
and in terms of an absence of inhibitive factors during 
times of heightened tension. The concept of preven-
tion itself has seen a shift over the last few years, from 
being understood as processes that address the causes 
of potential deadly violence, to strategies that build re-
silience and mitigate risk (see Ban Ki-moon, 2013). This 
shift in approach demands that we better understand 
not only why atrocities occur, but also how and why 
they are avoided. 
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